Participatory Management of Sundarbans
and The Experience of West Bengal ,
India
Sundarbans
is one of the last tropical deltaic mangrove forests in Asia ,
the rest having convened to rice agriculture. A rare and endangered ecological
system, the deltaic mangrove wetland forest of the Sundarbans bridges Bangladesh and India
ir-r the southwest, bordering the Bay of Bengal .
Once a vast expanse of luxuriant mangrove forest, it has been reduced over the
years to a large extent due to land reclamation for agriculture, settlements
and ever growing biotic pressure on forest products.
Till
recent times, the landscape of the Sundarbans was a product of two
countervailing forces: conversion of wetland forests to cropland versus
sequestration of forests in reserves to be managed by the Forest Department
(FD) for long-term sustained yield of wood products. During the colonial
period, state reclamation efforts were encouraged through landlords by
increasingly favorable state policies (land grants, tax incentives, cadastral
surveys, and eventually colonization projects and subsidized irrigation). These
policies were designed by revenue officials to maximize the rate of
transformation of wetland forest to taxable agricultural land. In the late 19th
century as the rate of agricultural conversion increased, the colonial FD
sought to preserve the remaining Sundarbans forest by giving them legal status
as Reserve Forest . They were managed to provide a
sustainable supply of timber and fuel-wood for the growing population of
southern Bengal . Today the supplies of some
economically valuable tree species have been depleted and some mammals are
locally extinct.
Obviously
the question of management comes in a big way. Conventional state management is
questioned in many countries, because of declining productivity of state
forests, growing imbalance between supply and demand of forest products,
declining tree cover in state forests, and rising conflicts between FD staff
and local communities. Some experts argue that the main cause of deforestation
is the inability of forest owners/managers to exclude various user groups from
the resources which in theory are under a well-defined r property regime.
Therefore, the problem is not with the property regime as such, but with its
enforcement. This is relevant particularly in countries of the sub-continent,
where forest-fringe people continue to believe that the forests belonging to
them had unjustly been taken over by the former colonial government.
Another
group of experts argue that the effects of centralized control over forest
resources in the Indian subcontinent were: (i) diminished access to forest
lands and products for resident communities, with serious consequences for
their lifestyles, livelihood and security; (ii) enhancement of illegal use of
forests because of restrictions; and iii) virtual extinction of the traditional
practices and indigenous institutional mechanisms of forest use. Among the
policy makers, therefore, it is increasingly realized drat without me willing
participation of communities living in and around the forests, no programme of
sustainable management can succeed, Such views are reflected in the
multilateral agreements and declarations of recent years, such as, Agenda 21
(chapters 11 and 26) and Authoritative Statement of Forest Principals (para 5,
9a). However, participatory models are required more for Asian forests, most of
which are located close to population centers and local encroachments for
collection of fuel-wood, fodder or small timber are too rampant to be
controlled.
The
Forestry Sector Master Plan of Bangladesh
(1993-2012) states: "In such situations, conventional forest management
will not succeed participatory forestry
involving the villagers are the only recourse." The Plan regards the
following definition of participation as acceptable: "In participatory
forestry the participating farmers will be involved in planning,
decision-making and implementation of all its activities. Accordingly, many
countries have initiated a variety of participatory models in Latest management.
Today no policy-maker talks of any development/resource management project
without the ‘participation’ of local communities. The questions are: What kind
of participation? How does participation take place? What is the policy-legal
framework of participatory forest management?
With
such a perspective, the present paper attempts to analyze the management of the
Sundarbans in West Bengal, India The case of West Bengal as a learning
experience is relevant and important for Bangladesh for several reasons: a) both
areas share many similarities in historical experience and socio-economic
conditions; b) West Bengal portion of the Sundarbans is a truncated part of one
ecosystem, now severely degraded; c) 1-'Ds in both countries still bear the
colonial legacy of management; d) the Bengal area is the most densely populated
place in the world (except city states); and e) a model named joint forest
management (IFM), initiated back in 1972 on a pilot basis is reportedly proving
successful in regeneration of degraded state forests all over India including
in the Sundarbans. Thus, the first part of this paper lays down a Conceptual
Framework of participation, while the second part analyses the experience of
participatory management of the Sundarbans in West Bengal, India.
Part I: Conceptual Framework if
Participatory Resource Management
Erosion
of customary rights over land and trees due to state-sponsored privatization or
nationalization of natural resources is regarded as the real problem. In South Asia since the 1950s, local common property
resources/regimes (CPR) have broken down not so much by population pressure as
by inequitable privatization schemes. When Indian government authorities began
to privatize well-functioning CPR systems in the name of clarifying ownership and
helping the poor; the traditional village commons collapsed and the poorest
households received only one-half to one-third the amount of land given to more
prosperous households. Another Indian analyst argues that privatization of CPR
has led to overuse of forests because of unavailability of common pasture, and
the local rich have doubly benefited from such privatization - as owners of
nearby lands, they gradually encroached into the adjacent public forest lands.
Such
actions fit the CPR Tragedy Model (Fig.1), articulated by Garrett Hardin. It
argues that individual rationality manifest in the form of maximizing benefits
leads to collective tragedy It calls for a superior force in the form of
private or state ownership and management. Accordingly some argue for private
property rights to well-defined parcels of forest lands either through sale in
the financial market or by lottery But the experience of some countries like Indonesia , Malaysia
and the Philippines
indicate that large private firms, guided by a profit-making motive, could not
manage forests with an objective of long term sustainability.
Experiences
also show that the so-called ‘effective hegemony’ imposed by government
resource managers worsens the problem by undermining local users' responsibility
to protect resources. This is vindicated by the realities in the stale forests
of many countries including Bangladesh .
In recent years, because of environmental degradation, state agencies in the
developing world are tightening zoning and other centralized restrictions on
land and resource use. If past experiences are any guide, such a renewed
centralized control of resources under heavy biotic pressure is utterly
misplaced.
But
the other, Viability Model of CPR (Fig.1) is supported by the empirical
research of Bromley, Cernea, Ostrom and others. Their studies show that many
communities dependent on common resources, both in developed and developing
countries, have devised and sustained informal/customary ways to control access
to the resource and institute rules among the risers. The CPR tragedy model
simply conflates "common property" with “open access" resources.
To viability advocates, CPR management is a question of identifying the
appropriate social and institutional arrangements at the community level.
Michael Cernea (1989), senior adviser to the World Bank, pointed out:
"Resource degradation in the developing countries,
while incorrectly attributed to common property systems’ intrinsically actually
originates in the dissolution of local level institutional arrangements whose
very purpose was to give rise to resource use patterns that were
sustainable."
Communities
with power to control some resources are seldom prone to destructive practices.
Dangers arise when the rural elite or elite-backed governments take away local
control. Incentives to conserve then disappear: Non-accountable government
agencies, such as forest departments, irrigation bureaucracies and marketing
boards often constitute the greatest single threat to secure local control by
ordinary farmers and the landless. Agarwal thus argues:
"Whenever national bureaucracies have taken over
management role, discharged by local communities, systems of traditional
governance over natural resources have broken down, and local communities were
alienated and environmental resources suffered.”
Thus,
Agenda 21 includes a Chapter on promoting `sustainable livelihoods' for the
poor; and this builds on the positive experiences of many community-based
initiatives in resource management. After spending about US $1.5 billion on
forestry projects in Asia between 1979 and
1990, the World Bank admits that its actions "have had a negligible impact
on borrower's forestry sectors as a whole." The Brundtland Report entitled
Our Common Future argues, "Programs to preserve forest resources must
start with the local people who are both victims and agents of destruction . .
. They should be at the centre of integrated forest management, which is the
basis of sustainable agriculture." The Report also acknowledged that
achieving sustainable development (SD) requires a fundamental change in the way
natural resources are owned, controlled and used.
This
brings in the question of linkage between management regime and property rights
on natural resources. Property can be regarded as a secure claim to a resource
or its services. Property rights/regimes in natural resources exist in usually
four forms (Fig.1):
a) Private property;
b) Open access resource, where legal rights are not
clearly defined;
c) State property where the legal claim rests with the
government, such as in land and forests; and
d) Common or communal property resources (CPR), where
individuals have claims as members of recognized groups,
During
the times of antiquity all natural resources belonged to the Crown or the
Sovereign. The citizens, often in groups, were given the usufructs, a use right without legal ownership. During the
industrial period, increased technological power and mobility created an open
system in which resource substitution and importation
|
Fig.1
minimized
the fears of scarcity, Resources were therefore perceived as being both
absolutely and relatively abundant. During this period, according to O'Riordan
(1985), social controls over resource appraisal and allocation gave way to
laissez-faire and the freedom of rights of the individual. Competition set the
rules and economic principles dominated the allocation process in the
then-industrializing world. In the colonized world, the Western concept of
rights of the individuals over that of the community was strengthened, as
individuals began to buy/own formerly communal properties. Currently there is
no problem with private property rights in general. However, there are serious
problems with the last two categories, i.e. state property and CPR. Alienation
of poor communities compounded the problem of government management, which
falls to control encroachments from local and distant sources. Therefore,
sustainable resource management is argued to be a function of cooperation at
all levels. It is argued that this cooperation will sustain through 'effective`
participation of local communities, who are the best guards against distant and
more powerful encroachers.
People‘s Participation: Varied
Interpretations
Participation,
like SD, has become an umbrella term for a new approach to development
intervention. A review of relevant literature in such disciplines as economics,
political science and sociology presents a complex and confusing picture of the
concept.
Disagreements
occur as to what participation really means or how it should be realized. The
fundamental split is between those who see participation as a means to an end,
and those who advocate it as an end in itself. As a goal in itself, community
participation is viewed by some as a necessity for individual and social
well-being; others see it as a 'basic need by itself of men and women.’ Such
views are related with the perceived inadequacies of the new democratic
nation-states, where the newly-forming political institutions usually bypass
the poor and marginalized populations. The democratization process in the South
is dominated by the urban middle class, in cooperation with the rural elite.
The latter have at times used democratic procedures to consolidate and extend
local power. UNDP’s 1993 Human Development Report estimated that more than 90%
of the global population is unable to exert a meaningful impact on economic,
political and social functioning of societies they live in.
Therefore,
participation is to be concerned with power; particularly to control resources
and decision-making. Brazilian sociologist and dependency theorist FH Cardoso
(who was elected President of Brazil) argued that participation ought to be
linked to political activity in broader arenas, and not confined to
small-scale, problem solving efforts. Attaining sustained participation thus
requires major political change and decentralization, nut of administrative
bureaucracy (as often is done), but of management of resources. Thus, what is
needed first is economic democracy without which political democracy has no
meaning for the poor and disenfranchised. The focus should be on socioeconomic
empowerment through implementing land reforms, providing security of tenure,
employment and support programmes, expansion of educational opportunities in
rural areas etc. Once the poor as a group are sensitized enough about their
condition, they can exert their voice in local and ultimately national-level
decision-making.
Empirical
studies by scholars of participatory development, such as Uphoff (1979), Oakley
and Mars den (1984), Blair (1985), Ghazi (1994) and Medley (l986) show that
state-initiated community participation was often meant for cooptation,
political mobilization or clienteles. In most of the cases a top-down approach
to development has remained essentially unchanged, So state-directed
participation is regarded as a paradox, While the state now controls resources
and the lives of its citizens to an extent previously unknown, it is naive to
assume that the ruling elite readily agree to devolution of authority to the
masses. Medley (1986) presents four types of state responses to participation,
based on such criteria as state definition of what participation entails, or
the degree to which it is willing to devolve power to local institutions: a)
the anti-participatory mode (participatory initiatives are viewed by regimes as
threats and are suppressed); b) the manipulative mode (participatory rhetoric
is used by regimes for some ulterior motive); c) the incremental mode (regimes
officially support participation, but policia are vaguely formulated and
incrementally implemented); and d) the participatory mode (regimes create
machinery for effective participation through devolution). These fonns are not
definitive, and a state may fall between one or more categories at various
points of time. A typology of participation can be seen in Table 1.
However
there is no agreed set of indicators for comparison of the participation
processes. Political regimes greatly differ in the degree of participation they
allow in the development process. Experiences in many developing countries
indicate a trend of distorted implementation of policies because of a lack of
accountability on the part of ruling elite, Therefore, to examine the process
at the micro-level, participation has to be looked at through the questions
that Norman Uphoff, a leading theoretician of participatory development,
suggests: namely WHO participate, WHAT kind of participation takes place, and
HOW it takes place. Then state responses to participation can be checked
against the framework of the four participatory modes, mentioned before. Such
an approach helps locate and explain the degree of fit between the policy
framework and its implementation.
Table
2: Typology of Participation in Development Projects
Typology Characteristics of Each Type
1. Manipulative Participation Participation
is simply a pretence, with “people's” representatives on official committees,
but who are unelected and have no power.
2.Passive/Pseudo-Participation People participate by being told
what has
been
decided or has already happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an
administration or project management without any listening to peop1e's responses,
The information being shared belong only to external managers/ professionals.
3.
Participation by Consultation People participate by
being
consulted or by answering
questions. External agents define
problems & information gathering
process, and so control analysis.
Such a consultative process does
not concede any share in decision
making, and professionals are
under no obligation to take on
board people’s views.
4.
Participation for Material People participate
by contributing
Incentives resources,
for example, labor; in
return for food, cash or other
material incentives. Farmers may
Incentives
provide land and labor, but are
involved in neither
experimentation nor the process of
learning. It is very common to see
this called participation, yet people
have no stake in prolonging
technologies or practices when the
incentives end.
5.
Functional Participation Participation seen
by external
agencies as a means to achieve
project goals, especially reduced
costs, People may participate by
forming groups to meet
predetermined objectives related to
the project. Such involvement may
be interactive and involve shared
decision-making, but tends to arise
only after external agents have
already made major decisions. At
worst, local people may still only
be co-opted to serve external goals.
6.
Authentic/interactive People
participate in joint analysis,
Participation development of action
plans and
formation or strengthening of
local institutions. Participation is
seen as a night, not just the means
to achieve project goals. The
process involves interdisciplinary
methodologies that seek multiple
perspectives and make use of
systematic and structured learning
processes. As groups take control
over local decisions and determine
how available resources are used,
they have a stake in sustaining the
structures/practices.
7.
Spontaneous Participation/ People participate by
taking
Self
-mobilization
initiatives independently of
external institutions to change the
system. They develop contacts with
external institutions for resources
and technical advice they need,
but retain control over how
resources are used. Self-
mobilization can spread if
governments and NGOs provide an
enabling framework of support.
Such self-initiated mobilization
may or may not challenge the
existing distribution of wealth and
power.
Source:
adapted from Pretty; J.N., “Participatory Learning for Sustainable
Agricultural, World Development 23(8),
1995.
Part
11: Participatory Forest Management in West Bengal , India
Based
on a policy of inclusion, many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America have developed a variety of participatory models in forest
management, These models can be grouped into the following broad typology:
1) Farm and homestead forestry
2) Group farm forestry as in West
Bengal
3) Cooperative/Community woodlot, as in China and Korea
4) Joint forest management, as in India , Nepal
and Indonesia
5) Management by indigenous communities/NGOs in Thailand , the Philippines and in some Latin
American countries
6) Communal/private lease contracts, as in China or the Philippines
7) Collaborative forest management, as in Thailand or Indonesia (in this model, a
triangular collaboration takes place among social scientists, FDs and local
communities/NGOs)
As
there is no universally accepted framework of the participation process, these
models differ widely in their working dynamics. However; the model of joint
forest management UTM) in West Bengal deserves
particular mention. Informally initiated as a pilot protect in the Sal forest
of Arabari, southwest West Bengal in 1972 by some forest officials, led by Dr
Ajit K. Banerjee (then DFO of Silviculture, South), the model of JFM proved
successful in regenerating the degraded Sal forests. The model was based on
care (protection by villagers through social fencing) and share (usufructs
including 25% of timber value). The state and federal governments formally
approved the model in 1989 and 1990 respectively for nation-wide replication.
Currently FDs of almost all Indian state governments have introduced JFM and thousand of forest protection committees
(FPCs) have been formed all over India But West Bengal leads me programme to
date, with the extent of people’s involvement regarded as the highest, compared
to the rest of India .
This leading status of West Bengal in}FM can be discerned from the following
criteria: a) Regeneration of forests; b) Restitution of biodiversity; c) Income
generation; d) Cost-effectiveness; and e) Acceptance of JFM at the micro,
national and international levels, Currently, the FPCs in West Bengal protect
an area over half the state forest land. The fact that forests are protected
and regenerated better through people’s participation, compared to traditional
custodial management, has been widely recognized. Together with its rapid
spread across India ,
other countries are applying JFM in their own ways. In 1992 the FPCs of West
Bengal collectively received the Paul Getty international award for their
contribution to forest regeneration. In the mid-90s, the World Bank had
extended a project loan of US $54 million to finance the promotion of IPM in West Bengal , a state ruled by a left-front government
(LFG) since 1977.
Status of the West
Bengal Part of the Sundarbans
In
the late 19th century the total area of the Sundarbans comprised about 19,500
sq kms of which the Indian/West Bengal part was 9,650 sq kms. Currently the
area under Reserve
Forest is 4.2 sq kms and
the rest of the area is reclaimed and inhabited. Over 2,585 sq kms of forest
area, the Sundarbans tiger Reserve
Forest had been created
in 1975 and the rest was demarcated for forestry activities. There are three
wildlife sanctuaries, namely Sajnekhali, Haliday
Island and Lothian Island
and one National park within the Sundarbans Biosphere Reserve area.
Administrative boundary of the Sundarbans passes through two districts i.e.
north 24-Parganas and south 24- Parganas covering 19 Blocks - 6 under the
former and 13 under the latter
Socio-Economic Status of People in the
Sundarbans
Over
four-fifths of the people living in the Sundarbans are dependent on agriculture
on reclaimed land which bear mostly single crop of paddy. Besides agriculture,
other occupations are finishing and pisciculture, honey collection and
wood-cutting. Some 50% of agricultural laborers are landless. And 44% of total
population belongs to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes. As a result, the
level of literacy and per capita income are much lower in the Sundarbans than
in other parts of West Bengal . The
communication is also very poor and most of the areas are inaccessible. Though
some of the points are linked with Calcutta
by few metal roads, communication in this area dissected by the network of
numerous streams and canals is dependent mainly on boats and motor launches.
Protection/Conservation: Administrative
Measures and Infrastructural Facilities:
1. One
Director in the rank of CCF is in overall charge of Sundarbans Biosphere
Reserve (SBR) under which comes the Sundarbans Tiger Reserve.
2. There
is a State-level Steering Committee for the Sundarbans Mangroves and Biosphere
Reserve Management` constituted to guide and oversee the Biosphere Reserve
Program and its activities. Chief Secretary Govt. of West Ben al, is the
Chairman of this Committee and the Representative of the Government of India Principal Chief
Conservator of Forests, Director of SBR, a number of specialists,
representatives of NGOs and Shabhadhipatis of both north and south 24 Parganas
Zilla Parishads are members of this Committee.
3 There
is a Monitoring Sub-Committee to monitor the physical and financial
performances of all projects under the Mangrove Biosphere Reserve Program and
to assess the impact of various components of the projects including generation
of employment, economic upliftment of the people along with their attitudes and
acceptance of the schemes.
4. There
is also a Research Sub-Committee under the state-level Steering Committee to
identify the research areas concerning social adversities, study on impact of
pollution, effect of traditional system and development of more productive
System.
Major Central and sore Projects
Important
on-going schemes are:
A Centrally sponsored Schemes are:
i) Establishment of SBR
ii) Conservation and Management of Sundarbans mangroves
iii) Integrated Afforestation and Eco-Development
Project.
B. West Bengal Forestry Project (World
Bank-funded).
C. Area-Oriented
Fuel wood and Fodder Program (50% Centrally sponsored Scheme).
JFM and Eco-Development of People in and
around the Sundarbans
Traditional
form management and mere policing were found to be insufficient to conserve
mangrove forests and their biodiversity SBR was, therefore, created with the
main thrust on socioeconomic development activities with conservation and
ensuring people’s participation in the process through mass awareness building
and motivation. Following the success of JFM through Forest Protection
Committees (FPCs) in the fringe villages in other pans of West Bengal, the same
system has also been introduced in SBR area While forming the FPCS, stress has
been given to include all the families in the villages taking one member from
each family with the prevision of joint membership for each household (husband
being a member; wife becomes automatically a member).
As
provided in the Government Order of 1989, the members of FPCs will be entitled
to 25% of net sale proceeds of final harvesting of plantations/forests and 25%
of the intermediate yields from coppicing, multiple shoot-cutting and thinning
and collection of fallen twigs, grass its, flowers, seeds etc. For
socioeconomic development of the people, a package of eco-development programme
which includes Mari culture, aquaculture, bee-keeping, farm forestry,
horticulture, distribution of smokeless Chula, use of solar energy for
generating electricity, vocational training, health services, veterinary
services, etc. are being implemented. With the economic upliftment of the
people in and around the Sundarbans, the buffer population will help protect
the mangrove forests and their eco-system from the biotic interference. This
will also minimize the age-old man-animal conflict. Many FPCs comprising of
villagers have already been formed and recognized within the areas of
24-pargarras.
Pisciculture: Under SBR programme, ponds close to the bank of rivers
have been excavated at government cost and each such pond is being handed over
to a group often beneficiaries in the villages as per recommendations of local
Pantalets. Importance has also been attached to popularize culture of edible
oysters and crabs.
Honey Collection & Apiculture: On an average 60,000 kgs of honey are extracted from
the Sundarbans every year through the honey- collectors and FD takes the honey
as well as wax from them at fixed tariff and arrange for sale of filtered honey
after processing in the Departmental Filtering Unit at Sealdah. About a
thousand of families earn their livelihood through collection of honey from the
Sundarbans forests.
Apiculture
(bee-keeping) is now gradually becoming popular and necessary training is
imparted under the SBR programme. Apiary- boxes have been distributed among the
villagers as per recommendation of local Penchants and these are supplementing
the income of the beneficiaries.
Timber & Other Forest
Products - Their Uses: At present,
matured natural forests are extracted for timber and fuel-wood on a rotation
Smokeless Chullah & Use of Solar
Energy: Such chullahs are very useful
to combat the win problems - scarcity of fuel-wood as well as pressure on
conventional energy sources. More than 14,000 chullahs have been distributed to
the villagers within SBR by the mid-90s. Trial on use of solar energy for
generation of electricity particularly for illumination purpose proved to be
useful in some areas within SBR. Important locations within the STR area are
also illuminated at night by use of solar energy So far; several hundred points
within the SBR have been brought under solar energy technology.
Vocational Training: To generate scope for self-employment and help earn
supplementary income, the SBR wing organizes vocational training for the villagers
in the Sundarbans area on Pisciculture, Poultry Apiculture and Horticulture.
Educational Trips: Villagers from fringe areas are taken to the forests
of Sundarbans and other parts of West Bengal
to make them acquainted with various aspects of JFM and status of forest
protection there. Trips are also arranged for students from different
schools/colleges for their exposure to nature and diverse flora and fauna of
the Sundarbans.
Awareness: With a view to expose the villagers and students of
schools and colleges to various aspects of JFM and conversation of forests and
wildlife, video shows in different areas on forestry and wildlife are arranged
by different units of SBR. Two centers - one at Sajnekhali and another at
Bhagabatpur have also been established keeping these objectives in View
Role of Women: Women folk in the Sundarbans play a significant role
along with men in earning their livelihood, in IFM, wives have the joint
membership in FP(1s along with their husbands. Women groups are also taken to
villages for their motivation and awareness through dialogues, meetings and
conventions. Training programmes suitable for women are also organized.
Health & Veterinary Service: FD in collaboration with the Department of Health
& Family Planning has started coordinated health-service programme to fill
up the gap and periodic health-service camps are organized in remote villages
taking advantage of available infrastructural facilities of SBR and knowledge
of foresters about the people and the locality Health service camps are also
organized in the villages with NGOs, Besides the necessary assistance from
the Directorate of Veterinary for
extending such services in the villages, the STR project has also veterinary
experts to serve the local needs.
Coordination with Other GOs: It is an uphill task for the SBR wing of FD with
limited resources to fulfill the total objectives of Biosphere Programme to
coordinate the three elements of Eco-restoration, Eco- conservation and
Eco-development. Therefore, coordination is maintained among the departments of
Agriculture, Irrigation, Health & Family Planning, Animal Resource
Development, Education, Fisheries, Science & Technology and Department of
Sundarbans Affairs. Sundarbans Development Board has been taking part in the
execution of substantial work of afforestation, soil conservation and
socio-economic development under the SBR. Calcutta Port Trust is also
associated with afforestation and research programme of the SBR in the vicinity
of their working zone.
Role of NGOs in SBR: Many NGOs are involved in the SBR programme, but they
work in partnership with the FD. The NGOs do not control many resources
independent of the government, either in the West Bengal or elsewhere in India .
A Synthesis: It was proposed in the framework that the experience
of West Bengal would be checked against the
four modes of state responses to participation. Looking through these lenses,
it may be deduced that West Bengal falls in
between the incremental and participatory modes. State policy has legitimized
community participation in forest management. Community needs have been given
preference to industrial needs in forest products by the Forest Policy of 1988
(a reversal of prior policies). The policy laid out some modalities of
implementation. The democratically-elected left-front government initiated
important structural changes, such as a) land reforms and share-cropper`
rights, b) effective Panchayati Raj, and c) integrated implementation of rural
development programmes, led by the increasingly representative local
leaderships. The LFG power base commands the required autonomy independent of
the vested, propertied classes to pursue reforms and policies within a social-
democratic framework that favors the poor. However; it must be mentioned that
the LFG did choose to ride the winning horse of JFM, led by the FD. But the LFG
policies helped sustain the programme of JFM.
The
FD bureaucracy as a whole appears committed to the programme, as evident from
their activities, departmental restructuring and initiatives for attitudinal
changes through training of officers, with NGO assistance. The FD’s attempt to
maximize employment benefits to the FPC members through tuning their operations
during the lean season, and coordinating other programmes in the fringe areas
are further evidence to their commitment. From discussions with the FD
officials of West Bengal , it was clear that in
a traditionally hierarchical, structured bureaucracy such as the FD,
initiatives for effective participatory management have to come from within the
bureaucracy itself. Because as an organization it develops a vested interest to
maintain its own value systems and becomes resistant to outside
forces/influences coming in. Such a thesis is borne out by other country
experiences, such as the US Forest Service.
The
above factors can be viewed as elements of a participatory mode. But it
contains contradictions: rather than empowering the FPCs, it strengthens die
state, as well as the party in power The problem is: the core feature of
participatory mode - the devolution of power and decision-making down to the
local community organization, the FPC - is still missing. The amendment to the
state government order of 1990 has expanded the FPC role from mere protection’
to various activities, but die latter formulation is vague, and findings from
the field indicate that all those activities pertain to 'responsibilities' only
on FD terms. The federal circular also stipulates community participation in
the planning process. As seen, the FD staffs carry out all such activities.
With the provision of registration of FPCs only with the FD, the former even
does not have any legal status. Tire FPCs are yet to play the role of an actor:
Although
the LFG drive for political mobilization of the rural masses through national
and local party institutions has achieved sustained electoral victories since
1977, the accumulated political sensitization and empowerment are not yet
reflected in the FD-FPC equation. The power o the local government representatives
regarding die FPC activities is still recommendatory in nature. This shows
either the regime is not yet sure of the efficacy and viability of local level
devolution in JFM programme, or that participation is not taken by the
political regime as a goal in itself, or drat the still developing
participatory political-administrative processes are yet to wrest control in
directing the programme implementation.
As
a result, the government muddles through in its implementation of die
programme, changing its orders in an incremental fashion, despite the fact that
spontaneous participation of villagers in the FPC programme anti-dated the
government approval. With the current level of participation and its
functioning, JFM might be sustained the way it is so long as the LFG remains in
power since under it, the local power structure includes the poor low-caste and
tribal population, Buta change of government in West Bengal, headed by Congress
or Bhartya Janata Party in future may change the balance again in favor of the
propertied class. In that case, &e future of JFM with its current
dependence on extra-community forces and levers of power for functioning does
not augur well. Even after years of functioning, the programme fails to develop
a community leadership, able to take charge, independent of the regime in
power, or the local foresters’ patronizing role, As a further setback, the
Indian Forest Act appears to be a new brake on JFMs march forward: its
restrictive provisions may further disempowered the communities, and strengthen
bureaucracy and the state. In any case, with all its drawbacks, _IFM can still
be regarded as the initial Slip towards the larger frame of community control
and management of a vital natural resource like forests.
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